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Criminal Law Practitioner
NOLO CONTENDERE CONVICTIONS: THE EFFECT OF
No CONFESSION IN FUTURE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Ramy Simpson
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well established that evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions can significantly
impact the outcome of a criminal trial. There-
fore, society has an interest in ensuring that the
conviction reliably proves that the defendant
committed the prior crime. When courts admit
convictions into evidence for purposes allowed
by the Federal Rules of Evidence or applica-
ble state rules, the rationale behind their use
is that the convictions are reliable and trust-
worthy.2 This rationale is also why there is a
hearsay exception for admitting them into ev-
idence.3 However, does the notion that guilt
is certain differ based on whether the convic-
tion is the result of a trial, a guilty plea, or a
nolo contendere plea? Courts have not wavered
in holding that for the purposes of the legal
proceeding, a conviction based on a trial or a
guilty plea is sufficient to prove that the defen-
dant committed the prior act.4 However, when
a defendant pleads nolo contendere, common-
ly known as "no contest," the defendant does
not expressly admit guilt, and the judge is not
procedurally required to determine whether
there is a factual basis for the charge.' Is the
defendant's guilt here as certain as a conviction
based on a trial or guilty plea? Courts have dif-
fered on whether the government can proffer
records of nolo contendere convictions (herein-
after "nolo convictions") under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) as evidence of prior bad acts.6
This comment argues that the guilt is less cer-
tain, and that because of the lesser degree of
certainty, the history of nolo contendere pleas,
and the construction of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, records of nolo convictions cannot be
used to prove prior bad acts under Rule 404(b).
Instead, the government must proffer evidence
of the facts underlying the nolo conviction to
prove matters under 404(b).
' E.g., L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a Dilemma After Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 615, 651-52 (2001); Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule ofEvidence 609: A Look at How
Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 38 (1999) (citing Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On
the Inefficacy ofLimiting Instructions When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47
(1985)); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY
L.J. 135, 174 (1989) ("The assumption that a defendant can be afforded a fair trial under these conditions is dangerously wrong.
The Supreme Court has recognized that serious matters of prejudice cannot be cured by judicial admonition to the jury." (citing
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1968)).
2 Anna Robert, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 580 (2014).
Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments As Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 988-89 (1986).
* E.g., United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 865 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1365
n.10 (8th Cir. 1979).
Infra Section II(A), (A)(2).
6 The law is clear that the government can proffer records of nolo convictions for impeachment purposes and when a convic-
tion is an element of the crime the defendant is currently charged with, such as the charge of "Felon in Possession of a Firearm."
Therefore, this comment will not take a position on the use of nolo convictions for those purposes.
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It. BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) al-
lows proof of prior bad acts if the evidence
is used to prove "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident."' This includes
evidence of crimes that the defendant was not
charged with.8
For a federal court to admit evidence
of prior bad acts, the judge needs to make a
preliminary determination under Rule 104(a).9
The judge must determine that "the jury can
reasonably conclude that the act occurred and
that the defendant was the actor" before al-
lowing the government to use the evidence.10
This is a modest standard that the government
can meet with a certified record of a convic-
tion based on a trial or guilty plea, even without
any other evidence accompanying the record."
However, courts differ on whether a record of
a nolo conviction can be admitted under 404(b)
when considering other provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and what a defendant
admits when pleading nolo.12
A. An Overview of Nolo Con tendere Pleas
It is not entirely certain what a defen-
dant admits when pleading nolo contendere. In
Lott v. United States, decided in 1961, the Su-
preme Court held that a defendant who pleads
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
E.g., United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393-94 (2015);
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010);
see Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committees' note to 2000
amendments.
' Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988)
(citation omitted).
10 Id.
" E.g., United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 865 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc); United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314,
1332 (1lth Cir. 1997); United States v. Arambula Ruiz, 987
F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
12 See infra Section II(B).
nolo is implicitly admitting "every essential
element of the offense that is well pleaded
in the charge," 3 and that it "is tantamount
to 'an admission of guilt for the purposes of
the case."'1 4 In United States v. A/ford," decid-
ed nine years after Lott, the Supreme Court
hedged on the notion that a nolo plea is an ad-
mission of guilt. The Court asserted that "it is
impossible to state precisely what a defendant
does admit when he enters a nolo plea in a way
that will consistently fit all the cases." 6 The
Court then explained that historically, the plea
has not been treated as an "express admission
of guilt," but rather as the defendant simply
not contesting the charges and agreeing to be
punished as if he or she were guilty.1
A/ford did not overrule Lott because its
analysis on the issue was dictum and it did
not cite Lott in its analysis of the nolo plea.
However, A/ford's assertion that it is uncertain
what a defendant admits when pleading nolo
was highly influential in lower court holdings
that a nolo conviction cannot be used in sub-
sequent criminal proceedings to prove that
the defendant committed the prior crime.
Not surprisingly, the Circuit that held that nolo
convictions can be used in subsequent crimi-
nal proceedings for this purpose cited Lott in
1 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961) (quoting United States v. Lair,
195 F. 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1912)) (internal quotation marks re-
moved).
14 Id. (quoting United States v. Hudson, 272 U.S. 451, 455
(1927)).
1 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
1 Id. at 35 n.8. Alford is best known for holding that a
defendant may plead guilty even while adamantly declaring
innocence if the evidence against the defendant is strong and
he pleads guilty at the advice of his counsel to avoid the uncer-
tainty of a sentence after trial. Id. at 38. This opinion created
the "Alford plea." The Court discussed nolo pleas to show
that that Constitution allows defendants to accept punishment
without expressly admitting guilt if going to trial would likely
result in worse consequences. Id. at 35.
0 Id.
a See infra Section II(B).
26 Washington College of Law Spring 2019
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its analysis.19 The range in interpretations of
what defendants admit when pleading nolo has
contributed to the circuit split on whether the
resulting convictions are admissible to prove
the defendant committed the prior crime.
1. How the Nolo Contendere Plea Originated
English common law inspired the use
of nolo contendere pleas in the American legal
system.20 The Supreme Court has even suggest-
ed that the plea originated as an early medi-
eval practice where defendants would request
to end the criminal case by offering to pay the
King money.21 When defendants sought this
compromise, they did not have to admit guilt.22
They only had to submit to the King's mercy
and ask for a fine.23 According to an early 1 9 th
century treatise, early English law considered
this an "implied confession":
An implied confession is where
a defendant, in a case not capi-
tal, doth not directly own himself
guilty, but in a manner admits it
by yielding to the king's mercy,
and desiring to submit to a small
fine: in which case, if the court
think fit to accept of such submis-
sion ... without putting him to a
direct confession, or plea (which
in some cases seems to be left to
1 United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.10
(8th Cir. 1979).
20 See Alford, 400 U.S. at 35 n.8 (citing old English authori-
ties when explaining how the nolo contendere plea originated).
21 Id.; see 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (1d Ed. 1899) (explaining
that English judges could "pronounce a sentence of impris-
onment and then allow the culprit to 'make fine,' that is to
make an end (finem facere) of the matter by paying or finding
security for a certain sum of money.").
22 Alford, 400 U.S. at 35 n.8 (citing Anon., YB.Hil., 9 Hen.
6, f. 59, pl. 8 (1431)).
23 Id.
discretion), the defendant shall
[a] not be estopped to plead not
guilty to an action for the same
fact, as he shall [b] be where the
entry is quod cognovit indictanen-
tu. "24
In English common law, the court en-
tered a judgment of quod cognovit indictamen-
tum after a defendant expressly confessed to
the crime, making quod cognovit indictarnentum
the equivalent of a guilty verdict in the United
States today.25 This passage shows that defen-
dants who implicitly confessed by submitting
to the King's mercy were allowed to plead not
guilty in subsequent proceedings that arose
from the same occurrence, but those who ex-
pressly confessed were forced to plead guilty
in those future proceedings.26 Thus, the King
provided protections that accompanied "im-
plied confessions," but these protections were
unavailable for "express confessions." 27 This
philosophy of leniency extended to American
courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ry, which believed that nolo convictions could
not "rightly be used against [the defendant] in
any other case."2 8
24 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF
THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED
UNDER PROPER HEADS 466 (8th ed. 1824).
21 Id. (explaining that an express confession "carries with it
so strong a presumption of guilt that an entry on record, 'quod
cognovit indictamentum,' etc., in an indictment of trespass
estops the defendant to plead 'not guilty' to an action brought
afterwards against him for the same matter.").
26 Id.
27 Id.
21 United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1912) (cit-
ing United States v. Hartwell, 26 F. Cas. 196, 201 (D. Mass.
1869); Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206 (1 Pick.)
(1829)).
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2. The Procedural Differences Between
Nolo Pleas and Guilty Pleas
There are three major procedural dif-
ferences between nolo pleas and guilty pleas,
which help explain why nolo convictions should
be treated differently in future litigation. First,
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) re-
quires that the judge inquire into the factual
basis for a guilty plea before accepting it. The
advisory committee notes explain that the in-
quiry is meant to "protect a defendant who is
in the position of pleading voluntarily with an
understanding of the nature of the charge but
without realizing that his conduct does not ac-
tually fall within the charge." 29 However, when
accepting a nolo plea, the judge does not have
to extend this protection to the defendant be-
cause Rule 11(b)(3) purposefully omits nolo
pleas from requiring a factual inquiry.30 Thus,
a defendant who pleads nolo can theoretically
be convicted of a crime outside the range of his
conduct.
Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 410
allows evidence of a defendant's guilty plea if it
becomes relevant in future litigation unless the
defendant withdrew the plea.3 1 This means that
evidence of the plea is allowed when it results in
a conviction. However, Rule 410 expressly bans
evidence of nolo pleas, regardless of whether
they were withdrawn, in future litigation with
the same defendant.3 2 Therefore, evidence of
29 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committees' note to 1966
amendments.
30 Id. ("For a variety of reasons it is desirable in some cases
to permit entry of judgment upon a plea of nolo contendere
without inquiry into the factual basis for the plea. The [factual
inquiry] is not, therefore, made applicable to pleas of nolo
contendere.").
Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(1).
Id. 410(a)(2); see ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO AMERI-
CAN TRLALS 229 (3d. 2011) ("[I]n many cases the most compel-
ling motivation to utilize the nolo contendere plea is precisely
a nolo plea is not admissible even when the
plea results in a conviction, which is inevita-
ble unless the defendant withdraws the plea
or the court rejects it.33 It is generally accepted
that this ban extends to convictions based on
a nolo plea in a civil proceeding arising out of
the same facts. 4 However, there is uncertainty
over whether the inevitable resulting convic-
tion from the plea is inadmissible against the
defendant in another criminal case. 5
Third, Federal Rule of Evidence Rule
803(22), a hearsay exception, states that felony
convictions based on guilty pleas are a hearsay
exception, but explicitly adds that convictions
based on nolo pleas are not an exception. 6
These differences indicate that there was a
clear congressional intent to treat nolo convic-
tions differently from guilty convictions in fu-
ture proceedings.
B. The Circuit Split
The Eighth Circuit was the first Court of
Appeals to answer whether a record of a nolo
conviction is admissible under Rule 404(b) as
evidence of prior bad acts. 7 In United States v.
Frederickson, the defendant was convicted for
to dispose of the case without creating adverse evidence for
subsequent civil or criminal litigation.").
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)-(d).
* Walker v. Schaeffer. 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th. Cir. 1988)
("Rule 410 was intended to protect a criminal defendant's use
of the nolo contendere plea to defend himself from future civ-
il liability."); COLIN MILLER, EVIDENCE: PLEA & PLEA RELATED
STATEMENTS (RULE 410) 8 (2013); David L. Shapiro, Should
a Guilty Plea Have a Preclusive Effect?, 70 IowA L. REV. 27,
36 (1984) ("[T]he nolo plea has no effect in a later civil suit."
(quoting 2 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDER-
AL RULES § 11:14 (1966))).
* See MILLER, supra note 34, at 12-13 (explaining that courts
are "split over whether Rule 410(a)(2) solely precludes the
admission of the nolo contendere plea itself or whether it also
precludes admission of the resulting conviction.").
6 Fed. R. Evid. 803(22)(A).
United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.10
(8th Cir. 1979).
28 Washington College of Law Spring 2019
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three counts of knowingly and willfully mak-
ing threats to harm the President.38 Given that
the defendant's intent when making the threats
was at issue, the trial court admitted the de-
fendant's prior nolo conviction for making a
false bomb threat under Rule 404(b) to prove
his intent in the current case.39 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit held that the nolo conviction
was admissible.4 0 Quoting the Supreme Court
in Lott, it reasoned that there is no basis for dis-
tinguishing between guilty convictions and nolo
convictions for purposes of admissibility under
404(b) because a defendant who pleaded nolo
to a prior crime admitted "every essential ele-
ment of the offense."41 However, the court did
not discuss the statutory distinctions between
guilty pleas and nolo pleas nor the propriety of
using nolo convictions in future proceedings.
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit inquired
about the admissibility of nolo convictions in
United States v. Nguyen.42 However, the question
before the court was not whether the convic-
tions are admissible under 404(b), but more
broadly whether they are admissible to prove
that the defendant actually committed a prior
crime.43 In Nguyen, the defendant was convict-
ed for "willful failure to comply with terms of
release under supervision."44 The term the de-
fendant allegedly violated stated that the de-
fendant must not "commit any crimes" while
on release, and the defendant was convicted of
violating this term based solely on two misde-
meanors to which he pleaded nolo contendere.45
Citing A/ford, the Ninth Circuit explained that
3 Id. at 1360.
* Id. at 1364.
o Id. at 1365 n.10.
4 Id. (quoting Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426
(1961)).
42 465 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 Id. at 1129.
" Id.
4 Id.
a nolo plea "is, first and foremost, not an admis-
sion of factual guilt."4 6 It determined that this
contributed to nolo pleas being a less reliable
indicator of actual guilt than a guilty plea.4 '
With this as its guiding philosophy, the
Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 410, which explicitly prohibited evidence
of nolo pleas, also prohibited "the convictions
resulting from them as proof that the plead-
er actually committed the underlying crimes
charged." 48 It explained that allowing the con-
victions resulting from the pleas, but not the
pleas themselves, would produce an irrational
result.49 The court elaborated by stating that
"Rule 410's exclusion of a nolo contendere plea
would be meaningless if all it took to prove that
the defendant committed the crime charged
was a certified copy of the inevitable judgment
of conviction resulting from the plea."5 0
Additionally, the court held that nolo
convictions are also barred under a Federal
Rule of Evidence hearsay exception, 803(22),
which includes felony guilty judgments in the
exception but expressly excludes judgments
based on nolo pleas.5 ' However, the court did
hold that records of convictions could be ad-
missible under 803(8), the public records hear-
say exception, to prove the mens rea of a de-
fendant accused of a subsequent crime under
404(b), but it still reversed the defendant's con-
viction because the evidence was not proffered
for that reason.52 The court's holding suggests
46 Id. at 1130.
4 Id. (citing Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 60 n.8 (1st. Cir.
1999)).
48 Id. at 1131.
4 Id.
50 Id.
5 Id. at 1131-32; see Fed R. Evid. 803(22) (Stating that
the following is a hearsay exception: "[e]vidence of a final
judgment of conviction if: (A) the judgment was entered after
a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea.").
5 Nguyen, 465 F.3d at 1132.
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that the Ninth Circuit believes that admitting
a prior conviction under Rule 404(b) to prove
a defendant's knowledge or intent in a subse-
quent crime is distinguishable from using the
evidence to prove the defendant was guilty of
the prior crime.
Finally, in 2017, the Eleventh Circuit is-
sued an en banc ruling on the matter in United
States v. Green.53 In Green, the defendant was
convicted of "being a felon in possession of a
firearm or ammunition."54 The district court
admitted evidence of the defendant's prior
2006 conviction from a nolo plea "for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, ammunition,
or an electric weapon" as evidence of prior
bad acts under Rule 404(b). The government
intended to use the evidence to help prove
that the defendant had the intent to possess
a firearm on this occasion.5 6 The judge in-
structed the jury that the evidence could only
be used to assess whether the defendant had
the required mental state for the charge he is
currently facing.
In a thoughtful opinion where the court
analyzed both the Frederickson and Nguyen
opinions, discussed the policy implications,
and detailed the differences between pleas
and convictions, the court held that Feder-
al Rule of Evidence 803(22) barred records
of nolo convictions from being admissible to
prove matters under Rule 404(b)." It explained
that admitting the nolo conviction under
404(b) was erroneous because it was used to
indicate that the defendant committed the pri-
or crime, and thus, the nolo conviction was not
admissible under 404(b).5 The court elaborat-
5 873 F.3d 846 (11th Cir. 2017).
* Id. at 850.
Id. at 857
6 Id. at 868.
Id. at 851.
5 Id. at 861-63, 866.
5 Id. at 866.
ed by stating that the government should have
presented evidence of the underlying facts of
the conviction-that the "Defendant so pos-
sessed ammunition on the date in question."60
However, it limited its ruling to Rule
803(22) because it determined that Rule 410
was "an uncertain basis on which to rest a
determination that a nolo conviction is not ad-
missible."61 The court reasoned that the plain
language of the Rule only excluded nolo pleas,
and that because nolo convictions were com-
monly used to prove the fact of conviction,62
this counseled "against a reading that Rule 410
contains an absolute prohibition on the use of
nolo convictions."63 The court did not rely on
either Lott or A/ford in its holding.
Frederickson, Nguyen, and Green are the
only three federal circuit court cases where
the answer to whether nolo convictions are
admissible as proof the defendant committed
the prior crime was central to their holdings.
In Olsen v. Corriero, the First Circuit recog-
nized the problems with not interpreting
Rule 410's ban on nolo contendere pleas to
encompass the resulting convictions when the
government proffers the evidence to prove the
defendant committed a prior crime.64 However,
it stopped short of holding that Rule 410 ap-
plies to the resulting convictions because the
court did not have to answer that question.65
60 Id.
61 Id. at 865.
62 An example of this would be using a nolo conviction to
prove that a defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm,
rather than using it to prove that the defendant in fact commit-
ted the crime that made him a felon.
63 873 F.3d at 865.
64 189 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 1999) ("If such convictions and
sentences were offered for the purpose of demonstrating that
the pleader is guilty of the crime pled to, then the nolo plea
would in effect be used as an admission and the purposes of
Rule 410 would be undermined.").
65 Id. at 62 ("Accordingly, there is no reason here to expand
Rule 410 beyond the scope of its plain language, which in rel-
evant part encompasses only nolo pleas." (citation omitted)).
30 Washington College of Law Spring 2019
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Additionally, in United States c. Adedoyin,6 the
Third Circuit suggested that Rules 410 and
803(22) barred the use of nolo convictions to
prove that the defendant actually committed
the prior crime,67 which is congruent with the
holdings in Nguyen and Green. Both the courts
in Olsen and Adedoyin only had to answer
whether the defendant's prior nolo conviction
could be used to prove that the defendant had
been convicted in the past, not whether the
defendant actually committed the crime he
was charged with.68 Both courts held that the
convictions could be admitted to prove the
fact of conviction, if that is an essential ele-
ment to the crime.69
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Key Statutory Distinctions
between Nolo Contendere Pleas and
Guilty Pleas and the Legislative History
of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
provides for a key difference between guilty
pleas and nolo pleas that helps show that a nolo
plea is not tantamount to a guilty plea.70 The
difference is that if a defendant pleads guilty,
the court must determine that there is a factual
basis for the plea." The court must ensure that
"the conduct which the defendant admits con-
stitutes the offense charged in the indictment
or information or an offense included therein
66 369 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004).
67 Id. at 344 ("It is true that a plea of nolo contendere is not
an admission of guilt and thus the fact that a defendant made
such a plea cannot be used to demonstrate that he was guilty
of the crime in question." (citing Olsen, 189 F.3d at 60)).
68 Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 345; Olsen, 189 F.3d at 62.
69 Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 344; Olsen, 189 F.3d at 61-62.
1o Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
7 Id. 11(b)(3).
to which the defendant has pleaded guilty."72
However, if the defendant pleads nolo, then the
court does not need to make a factual inqui-
ry into whether the defendant's conduct cor-
responds with the charge.73 This means that if
the defendant is charged with the wrong crime,
or if the facts are more congruent with a less-
er charge, the rules allow the court to convict
the defendant anyway because it is within the
court's discretion whether to review the facts.
Therefore, even if it is unlikely that the judge
will not make a factual inquiry into the basis
for the charge, courts must be cautious when
evaluating the reliability of a nolo conviction in
future proceedings as a procedural matter.
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provides
a second key difference between guilty pleas
and nolo pleas. It states that for a guilty plea to
be inadmissible against a defendant in a sub-
sequent case, the defendant needs to withdraw
the guilty plea.7 4 However, the defendant's nolo
plea is inadmissible even if the defendant does
not withdraw it, and thus, even when it leads to
a conviction. Therefore, to allow evidence of
the conviction that inevitably results from the
plea would seemingly undermine any intended
benefits that would come with prohibiting ev-
idence of the plea. As the Ninth Circuit stated
in Nguyen, construing Rule 410 to permit nolo
convictions would produce an "illogical result"
and would make Rule 410's prohibition on nolo
pleas meaningless. 76
A third distinction is that Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(22) makes evidence of a guilty
conviction a hearsay exception, but explicitly
states that nolo contendere convictions are not
72 Id. advisory committees' note to 1966 amendments.
7 Id.
71 Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(1).
7 Id. 410(a)(2).
76 United States v. Nguyen, 465 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.
2006).
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a hearsay exception. This is an important dis-
tinction based on the notion that "an implied
confession of guilt cannot rise to the degree of
certainty which would make it the equivalent of
an express confession."" The differences pre-
scribed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence sug-
gest that a guilty plea is more serious, and more
indicative of guilt, than a nolo plea.
Furthermore, the legislative history of
the Federal Rules of Evidence discusses nolo
pleas, albeit briefly, and it leans towards an inter-
pretation that the convictions are barred under
Rules 410 and 803(22)." The advisory commit-
tee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence
supported Rule 803(22) by stating that con-
victions based on nolo contendere pleas were
not included because "[t]his position is consis-
tent with the treatment of nolo pleas in Rule
410 and the authorities cited in the Advisory
Committee's Note in support thereof." 79 Thus,
the advisory committee drafted Rules 410 and
803(22) with the intention that the nolo con-
victions would be inadmissible, and Congress
accepted the proposed rules without altering
this.s The court in Nguyen used this language
as a basis for holding that nolo convictions are
inadmissible under Rules 410 and 803(22) to
prove that the defendant committed the prior
bad act."
The statutory distinctions and legisla-
tive history are congruent with what American
W Nathan B. Lenvin & Ernest S. Meyers, Nolo Contendere:
Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L. J. 1255, 1258 (dis-
cussing why nolo contendere pleas cannot be used for capital
crimes (quoting Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 250,
107 Atl. 729, 730 (1919))) (internal quotation marks omitted);
See Nguyen, 465 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted); Olsen v. Cor-
reiro, 189 F.3d 52, 60 (1st. Cir. 1999).
1 H.R. Doc No. 93-46, at 140 (1978).
7 Id.
so Id.
81 465 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2006).
courts held in the 18th and early 1 9th Century:
that nolo convictions could not "rightly be used
against [the defendant] in any other case."8 2 It
is well recognized in the United States that a
nolo conviction cannot be used against the de-
fendant in a civil proceeding arising from the
same occurrence, and that guilt in the civil case
will be litigated. 3 Therefore, there is no reason
why this same rule should not apply when the
government proffers the evidence in a criminal
case to prove that the defendant committed a
prior crime. As in a civil case, evidence proving
the facts underlying the conviction should be
admissible in a criminal case, but the record of
the conviction should not be admissible.
B. Where the Courts Were Correct
and Where They Went Awry
The Eighth Circuit in Frederickson erred
in holding that nolo convictions are admissible
under 404(b) as evidence of prior bad acts.84 The
court only considered the Supreme Court's
holding in Lott, that a defendant who pleads
nolo admits "every essential element of the of-
fense (that is) well pleaded in the charge," when
holding this way." However, the court should
have considered the history of nolo pleas and
the statutory protections provided for those in
future proceedings who pleaded nolo to a prior
charge. The history of nolo pleas and statutory
2 United States v. Lair, 195 F. 47, 52 (8th Cir. 1912) (cit-
ing United States v. Hartwell, 26 F. Cas. 196, 201 (D. Mass.
1869); Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. 206 (1 Pick.)
(1829)).
" Walker v. Schaeffer. 854 F.2d 138, 143 (6th. Cir. 1988)
("Rule 410 was intended to protect a criminal defendant's
use of the nolo contendere plea to defend himself from future
civil liability."); MILLER, supra note 34, at 8; David L. Shapiro,
Should a Guilty Plea Have a Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 27, 36 (1984) ("[T]he nolo plea has no effect in a later
civil suit." (quoting 2 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES § 11:14 (1966))).
84 601 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.10 (8th Cir. 1979).
a Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lott v. United States,
367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961)).
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protections should have been the basis of the
court's analysis because they reflect the com-
mon law and congressional intent better than
a sole inquiry into what a defendant admits
when pleading guilty.
Additionally, the court's explanation of
what a defendant admits when pleading nolo is
debatable because the Supreme Court in Unit-
edStates v. Alford explained in dictum that "it is
impossible to state precisely what a defendant
does admit" when doing so.86 Furthermore,
even if a court determines it is bound by Lott
rather Alford on the issue and that this is an
adequate legal basis for determining whether
nolo convictions are admissible under 404(b), it
should still hold that the convictions are not
admissible because Lott made clear that the
plea was an admission of guilt "for the purpos-
es of the case."" The plea would only act as an
admission for the purposes of the case because
at common law, the conviction could not be
used against the defendant in any subsequent
proceeding." Therefore, even if a court follows
Lott's determination of what a defendant ad-
mits, the court should not allow a nolo convic-
tion to be admitted under 404(b) because that
would be using the conviction against the de-
fendant in a future proceeding.
86 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8 (1970).
8 Lott, 367 U.S. at 426 (quoting Hudson v. United States,
272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926)) (internal quotation marks removed).
8 Hudson, 272 U.S. at 455 (describing how at common law,
a defendant who pleaded nolo can plead not guilty in any other
case brought against the defendant) (citation omitted); United
States v. Lair, 195 F. 47, 52 (1906) (explaining that even
though a defendant who pleads nolo admits to every essential
element of the crime, "the conviction cannot rightly be used
against him in any other case. Such is the effect of the plea of
nolo contendere.") (citations omitted); LEONARD W. LEVY &
KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 1820 (2d ed. 2000) ("Of the same immediate effect as a
guilty plea, [a nolo plea] admits the facts charged but cannot
be used as a confession of guilty in any other proceeding.");
see supra II.A.1.
The Eleventh Circuit in Green consid-
ered the statutory protections and interpreted
the law correctly when it held that nolo con-
victions are not admissible under 404(b) to
prove the defendant's guilt of the prior crime.8 9
It held that 803(22) was the only basis for this,
and not Rule 410.90 However, courts should in-
terpret both Rules 410 and 803(22) as barring
nolo convictions from evidence to prove guilt.
The legislative history of the Federal Rules of
Evidence explains that the advisory committee
intentionally did not include nolo convictions
as a hearsay exception under Rule 803(22) so
that the Rule was consistent with Rule 410's
"treatment of nolo pleas."9 1 This legislative his-
tory should have remedied the court's concern
that the plain language of the Rule only pro-
hibits the admission of nolo pleas. Additionally,
the court's argument that Rule 410 cannot act
as an absolute prohibition on nolo convictions
because courts have allowed their use to prove
the fact of conviction9 2 does not mean that Rule
410 theoretically could allow nolo convictions
to be used to prove the defendant committed
the prior crime. Proving the fact of convic-
tion has been distinguished from proving ac-
tual guilt because records of a nolo conviction
have been considered reliable enough to prove
the defendant was convicted, and courts have
construed certain federal statutes to allow nolo
convictions to prove the fact of conviction.9 3
89 873 F.3d 846, 866 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
9o Id. at 865.
91 H.R. Doc No. 93-46, at 140 (1978).
92 873 F.3d at 865.
9 See United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 344 (3rd Cir.
2004) (quoting Pearce v. United States Dep't of Justice, 836
F.2d 1028, 1029 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Notwithstanding Rule 410, a
conviction pursuant to a nolo contendere plea is a conviction
within the meaning of [21 U.S.C. § 824] and gives rise to a
variety of collateral consequences in subsequent proceed-
ings.")); Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 61 (1st. Cir. 1999)
(quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee's notes,
1974 amendment ("A judgment upon the plea is a conviction
and may be used to apply multiple offender statutes.")).
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Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit should have
held that both Rules barred records of nolo
convictions to prove matters under 404(b). The
First Circuit in Olsen and the Third Circuit in
Adedoyin were correct to distinguish between
the use of nolo convictions to prove the fact of
conviction and their use to prove the defen-
dant's guilt of the underlying facts that led to
the conviction.94 Those circuits were correct to
assert, although in dicta, that Rule 410 prohib-
ited the use of nolo convictions to prove the de-
fendant's guilt of the prior crime.95
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Nguyen
was the most puzzling compared to the oth-
er cases. The court was correct in most of the
opinion when it determined that Rules 410
and 803(22) both barred evidence of nolo con-
victions to prove the defendant committed
the prior crime.96 However, it undermined its
reasoning when it held that these convictions
are admissible under Rule 803(8), the public
records hearsay exception, to prove the defen-
dant's mental state under Rule 404(b), such as
intent or knowledge, in a subsequent criminal
case.97 The court, explicitly discussing misde-
meanor convictions but also referring to nolo
convictions, stated that these convictions "may
be admissible under Rule 803(8) to prove some
other element of a subsequently charged crime,
but they are not admissible to prove that the
defendant actually committed the underlying
crimes charged. ..
In justifying this, the Ninth Circuit cited
United States v. Loera, which was a case where
the court admitted evidence of a prior con-
viction under 803(8) to prove the defendant's
9 Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 344; Olsen 189 F.3d at 61.
95 Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 344; Olsen 189 F.3d at 60-61.
96 465 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2006).
9 Id. at 1132.
9 Id. (citation omitted).
knowledge under 404(b).99 The defendant in
Loera, Reginald Loera, was charged with sec-
ond-degree murder after driving while under
the influence of alcohol and causing a traf-
fic accident that killed someone. 00 Loera had
three prior convictions in California for "driv-
ing under the influence of intoxicating liquor,"
and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to
introduce evidence of those records to prove
the malice required in second-degree mur-
dero0 The Ninth Circuit held that it was per-
missible to introduce these records under Rule
404(b). 102
However, the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen and
Loeraerred in ruling that Rule 803(8) is a basis
for admitting prior nolo convictions to prove the
defendant's mental state because Rule 803(22),
the hearsay exception for prior convictions, al-
ready explicitly states that nolo convictions are
not included in the exception. 10 3 To use 803(8)
as a basis for admitting nolo convictions would
undermine 803(22) and make it irrelevant on
the issue. 104 Even the court in Nguyen stated that
[a] 11 judgments of conviction may be said to be
public records, but the exemption under Rule
803(8) cannot be deemed to cover such judg-
ments because it would make Rule 803(22) su-
perfluous."10 5 It appears the court determined
that a nolo conviction is admissible as evidence
to prove the defendant's mental state in a sub-
" 923 F.2d 725, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1991).
100 United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 726-27 (1991).
101 Id. at 727.
102 Id. at 729.
10s Fed. R. Evid. 802(22)(A).
14 PARK, supra note 32, at 357 ("It would be peculiar to allow
the broader rule, Rule 803(8), which was drafted without an
eye to the problem of evidentiary use of criminal convictions,
to be used as a way of getting around [the] intended limit [of
Rule 803(22)]."); see Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367,
1378 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that issues arise when other
hearsay requirements are used to "avoid the requirements
of Rule 803(22).").
"' Nguyen, 465 F.3d at 1132.
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sequent case because it is not being used to
prove that the defendant actually committed
the prior crime.106 However, this logic is flawed
because to use it to show that the defendant
had the required mens rea in the subsequent
case is to show that the defendant had the re-
quired Inens rea because he or she committed
the prior crime. To use the Ninth Circuit's own
example in Loera -admitting evidence of a pri-
or drunk driving offense to establish "the ele-
ment of malice required for second degree mur-
der, i.e., that the defendant had grounds to be
aware of the risk that drunk driving presented
to others," -is to show that the defendant was
aware of the risks of drunk driving because he
committed the prior drunk driving offense."o7
Using a nolo conviction to prove matters under
404(b) undermines the notion that nolo convic-
tions cannot be used to prove that the defen-
dant actually committed the prior crime.
C. The Effect This Will Have On Defendants
Disallowing the use of conviction re-
cords as proof of prior bad acts when the con-
viction was based on a nolo contendere plea will
not close all avenues for the government to
prove that the prior crime occurred. Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits evidence of
uncharged crimes as proof of prior bad acts.os
Thus, even though a record of a nolo conviction
is inadmissible, independent proof of the un-
derlying facts of the crime through testimony
106 Id.
10' Nguyen, 465 F.3d at 1132 (citing Loera, 923 F.2d at 729).
10s E.g. United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393-94 (2015);
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249-50 (3rd Cir. 2010);
see Fed. R. Evid. 404 advisory committees' note to 2000
amendments ("The amendment does not affect the admissi-
bility of evidence of specific acts of uncharged misconduct
offered for a purpose other than proving character under Rule
404(b).").
or appropriate hearsay exceptions will be ad-
missible under 404(b). 109
If the government cannot proffer any
independent evidence of the underlying facts
that led to the conviction, then this could sig-
nificantly impact a defendant's trial because
studies have shown that evidence of prior con-
victions and bad acts has a devastating impact
on a defendant's likelihood of acquittal.1 o One
prominent study that Professors RoselleWissler
and Michael Saks conducted using mock jurors
in a hypothetical simulation showed that the
conviction rate when the jury learned of a pri-
or crime was 75% when the crime was similar
in nature, 52.5% when it was not similar, and
42.5% when it did not know about the crime.11
If a prosecutor only has a record of a nolo con-
viction as proof that a prior crime occurred and
is unable to obtain evidence of the nolo convic-
tion's underlying facts, that could be the differ-
ence between a conviction and an acquittal.
1oI Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The evidentiary standard the govern-
ment must meet for the court to admit evidence of prior bad
acts is whether "the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the defendant was the actor." Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
110 Dodson, supra note 1 (Wissler, supra note 1, at 47 (1985));
Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to
Realign Federal Rules ofEvidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L.
REV. 533, 552 (1992) (citing Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N.
Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Delib-
erations ofSimulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1975-1976));
see also A. N. Doob and H. M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical
Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act
Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 93 (1972) (finding in a
Canadian study that on a scale from 1-7, 1 being guilty and
7 being not guilty, learning about a prior conviction brought
the perception of guilt from 4 to 3). Contra Larry Laudan &
Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact ofPrior Crimes Ev-
idence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process, 101
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 506 (2011) (citation omitted)
(concluding that the introduction of prior convictions only
increases conviction rates by slightly more than 10o).
" Dodson, supra note 1, at 38; Antonia M. Koped, Com-
ment, They Did It Before, They Must Have Done ItAgain; The
Seventh Circuit & Propensity to Use a New Analysis of 404(b)
Evidence, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 1055, 1087-88 (2016) (citing
Wissler, supra note 1, at 40).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the nolo contendere plea's or-
igin, its history, and statutory distinctions be-
tween guilty pleas and nolo pleas, records of the
resulting convictions should not be admissible
for the purposes of proving any matter under
404(b). The records of the convictions cannot
be used to prove that the defendant actually
committed the prior crime. Therefore, the gov-
ernment instead must proffer evidence of the
underlying facts that led to the nolo conviction
to prove matters under 404(b).
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